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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to test the outcome and substitution agency models of 
dividends at different stages of the corporate life-cycle.   
Research Findings/Insights: In a sample of 220 firms from 21 emerging market countries, I show that 
the outcome model of dividends, which predicts that dividend payout increases in the strength of 
shareholder rights, prevails all along the corporate life-cycle, but only where creditor rights are strong. 
Hence, the agency cost of equity and debt version of the outcome model of dividends holds. I find no 
evidence in support of the substitution model of dividends.    
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The findings in this paper serve to highlight the profound 
influence that creditors exert on corporate payout policy. When shareholders enjoy considerable legal 
rights, but not so creditors, creditors demand, and firms consent to lower dividends. Furthermore, I find 
no evidence to suggest that firms substitute (large) dividends for poor governance in emerging markets.    
Key Words: Corporate Governance; Agency Models of Dividends; Corporate Life-Cycle; Creditor 
Rights; Emerging Markets.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In their 2000 publication, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) present two 
agency cost models of dividends. The first model, referred to as the outcome model, suggests that dividends 
are an outcome of effective governance, where governance can be country governance i.e. legal rules, 
corporate governance, or both (see Mitton, 2004; and Bartram, Brown, How & Verhoeven, 2012). Given 
free cash flow, and their associated agency costs, shareholders prefer dividends to retained earnings since 
dividends reduce the pool of funds which can be consumed privately by controlling insiders (see Jensen, 
1986; Easterbrook, 1984). Presumably, while all shareholders have a preference for dividends given free 
cash flow, the outcome model suggests that it is the shareholders with the greatest legal rights (and/or 
belonging to better-governed firms) whom can extract the largest dividends from firms. Hence, the 
theoretical prediction of the outcome model is that dividend payouts increase in shareholder rights and 
free cash flow. However, when better-governed firms are young, growing fast, but still unprofitable (and 
thus presumably with negative free cash flow i.e. internal funds<funds required for investment), their 
shareholders do not demand larger dividends. In effect, they substitute lower current dividends for 
expected higher future dividends (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer &Vishny, 2000; Mitton, 2004; 
and Bartram, Brown, How & Verhoeven, 2012). In stark contrast, the shareholders of fast-growing 
poorly-governed firms do not agree to lower current dividends, and seek to extract as much as they can 
from firms in the form of a dividend. The logical conclusion from this line of reasoning, which is implicit 
in the assumptions underlying the agency models of dividends, is that the outcome model is more likely to 
prevail when firms are ‘mature’ i.e. when they are characterized as having diminished investment 
opportunities (i.e. the M/B ratio falls as the firm matures), experience slower growth, are profitable, and 
as a result have positive free cash flow. Hence, in the absence of growth, and the presence of free cash 
flow, shareholders demand dividends. The outcome model states that the shareholders of the better-
governed firms will extract the largest dividends.          
The second model, referred to as the substitution model predicts otherwise. This model predicts a 
negative relationship between the strength of shareholder rights (and/or corporate governance) and 
corporate dividend payouts. Poorly-governed firms pay the largest dividends. They do so for reasons 
which may appear on the face of it counter-intuitive. The reasoning behind these firms paying large 
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dividends is as follows. Begin with the notion that these poorly-governed firms are financially-constrained 
i.e. their internal funds are not sufficient to fund their investment opportunity set. Furthermore, the costs 
of external financing are prohibitively high, since the cost of (equity) capital decreases in the quality of 
corporate governance (Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009). For these firms, higher dividends serve to establish a 
reputation for equitable treatment of current (and potential shareholders), which in turn should allow 
these firms to access external capital at lower cost, thereby reducing their financing constraints. In effect, 
the management of poorly-governed firms substitute higher (current and future) dividends for lower 
external financing costs. In contrast, better-governed firms, whom are much less likely to be financially 
constrained, pay lower dividends. Furthermore, and as alluded to earlier, the shareholders of better-
governed firms accept lower current dividends given firm growth. Consequently, this line of reasoning 
suggests that the substitution model of dividends is much more likely to manifest when firms, of various 
governance qualities, are ‘immature’. ‘Immature’ firms are characterized as young, fast-growing, with 
sizable investment opportunities, but as of yet unprofitable, resulting in negative free cash flow. Better-
governed ‘immature’ firms pay lower dividends. Poorly-governed ‘immature’ firms pay reputationally-
enhancing large dividends. Hence, if the substitution model is to prevail, it is more likely to do so when 
firms are ‘immature’.   
In the period since the publication of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), a 
sizable literature has found support in favour of the outcome and substitution models of dividends. On the 
one hand, Mitton (2004), Chae, Kim and Lee (2009), Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011), Adjaoud and Ben-
Amar (2010), Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012), Brockman and Unlu (2009, 2011), Byrne and 
O’Connor (2012), Shao, Kwok & Guedhami (2009), and Sawicki (2009) in post-Asian crisis Asia, all 
support the view that dividend payouts increase in shareholder rights. On the other hand, John and 
Knyazeva (2006), Officer (2007), Jo and Pan (2009), Jiraporn and Ning (2006), Chae, Kim and Lee (2009), 
and Sawicki (2009) in pre-Asian crisis Asia, uncover evidence which supports the substitution model i.e. 
dividend payouts decrease in shareholder rights.            
In this paper I adopt a different approach. I begin with the premise that the outcome and 
substitution models of dividends are much more likely to prevail at different stages of the corporate life-
cycle. I exploit cross-sectional differences in corporate maturity, and test the outcome and substitution 
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models of dividends along the corporate life-cycle. This approach contrasts notably with almost all other 
studies, since these studies test both agency models, typically in a single-year, using a sample of firms at 
very different stages of their life-cycle.1 To perform these tests, I collect a sample of 220 firms from 21 
emerging market countries. Like Mitton (2004), I test the agency models of dividends using shareholder 
rights measured at the corporate level (i.e. corporate governance) by employing the corporate governance 
scores complied by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001), and use the firm maturity measures of 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), namely the ratio of retained earnings to assets (or total equity) to 
identify each firms position along its life-cycle. I find no evidence to suggest that the substitution model 
prevails when firms are ‘immature’. In contrast, the outcome model manifests all along the corporate life-
cycle i.e. for ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ firms. However, in a final series of tests, I show that the outcome 
model is contingent on both strong shareholder rights (i.e. quality corporate governance) and strong 
creditor rights. Where creditor rights are weak, dividend payouts tend to be much lower. Hence, the 
original agency cost of equity (i.e. the costs associated with the conflict between management/controlling 
insider and shareholders/outsiders) version of the outcome model of dividends, inclusive of the agency 
costs of debt equity (i.e. the costs associated with the conflict between the providers of capital to the firm, 
namely shareholders and creditors), which predicts that dividends are an outcome of strong shareholder 
and creditor rights, holds. This result is in line with the findings of Brockman and Unlu (2009), Shao, 
Kwok and Guedhami (2009), and Byrne and O’Connor (2012).           
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I present a brief literature review and develop 
three hypotheses. From here, I describe the data and present the empirical findings. I end with some 
concluding remarks.      
    
LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this paper I test two agency models of dividends, namely the outcome and substitution models of 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) at different stages of the corporate life-cycle. The 
corporate life-cycle model of dividends (see for example Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002), De 
Angelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu (2007), and Denis and Osobov 
                                                 
1 The primary drawback with this approach is that depending on the nature of the firms in the sample, the tests are 
likely to be biased towards an acceptance of one of the agency models over the other. 
 [5] 
 
(2008)) suggests that the likelihood of paying a dividend in the first instance and the dividend amount 
increases over the corporate life-cycle. The factors which determine the payout decision over the 
corporate life-cycle specifically relate to the firm’s investment opportunity set, their growth rate, the costs 
of external capital, and the agency costs associated with free-cash flow. Entirely inconsistent with the 
signalling models of dividends, the life-cycle model of dividends suggests that firms first pay a dividend, 
and continue to do so when they reach ‘maturity’.2 Mature firms are characterized as those whose 
internally-generated funds are more than sufficient to meet their diminished investment opportunity set 
(i.e., M/B ratio falls as firms mature), have lower growth rates, lower profitability, but positive and 
increasing free cash flow. For mature firms, dividends serve to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). In stark contrast, internal funds are not sufficient to meet the 
investment needs of fast-growing, unprofitable ‘immature’ firms. For these firms, there is neither the 
funds (i.e. free cash flow), nor the necessity from an agency perspective (no agency costs of free cash 
flow) to pay a dividend. The life-cycle model of dividends is summarized in Figure 1.3 In summary, 
according to the life-cycle model of dividends, and all else equal, ‘mature’ firms initiate and continue to 
pay dividends; ‘immature’ firms do not.    
The outcome and substitution models of dividends are theoretically grounded in Jensen’s (1986) free 
cash flow hypothesis. Both agency models agree that dividends paid to shareholders serve to reduce 
agency costs. In the case of the outcome model, dividends paid serve to reduce the agency costs of free 
cash flow. In the case of the substitution model, dividends paid serve to reduce the agency costs of poor-
governance, since some of these firms, whom are likely to be financing constrained, have negative free 
cash flow. However, these agency models of dividends disagree on one crucial point, namely the direction 
of the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and the likelihood of paying a dividend 
and the dividend amount (payout). Let’s elaborate further. Both begin with the premise that given free 
cash flow, shareholders (outsiders) prefer dividends to retained earnings, since expropriation of free cash 
flow by self-serving insiders is value-decreasing for minority shareholders.4 On the one hand, the 
                                                 
2 The signaling models of dividends suggest that dividend initiations lead and not lag (as the life-cycle model of 
dividends predicts) firm profitability (see for example Ross, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979).    
3 For an extensive review of the life-cycle model of dividends, see Bulan and Subramanian (2009).  
4 But will accept lower current dividends for expected higher future earnings given firm growth and strong corporate 
governance (see Mitton, 2004; and Bartram, Brown, How & Verhoeven, 2012). Chae, Kim and Lee (2009) show that 
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outcome model suggests that the ability on the part of shareholders to force firms to pay dividends rests 
crucially on the efficiency of the corporation’s governance system. Thus, the outcome model predicts that 
the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount (payout) increases when free cash flow exists 
and where shareholder rights are strong. 5 Hence, dividends are an outcome of strong corporate governance 
and free cash flow (Chae, Kim and Lee, 2009). 6 In the period subsequent to the publication of the La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) paper, numerous studies have found support in 
favour of the outcome model of , using either shareholder rights measured at the firm (corporate 
governance) or country level, or both (e.g., Mitton (2004), Chae, Kim and Lee (2009), Jiraporn, Kim and 
Kim (2011), Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010), Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012), Brockman 
and Unlu (2009, 2011), Byrne and O’Connor (2012), Shao, Kwok & Guedhami (2009), and Sawicki 
(2009) in post-Asian crisis Asia).  
On the other hand, the substitution model suggests otherwise. It predicts that poorly-governed 
firms, presumably with sizable agency conflicts, and wishing to enhance their reputation for equitable 
treatment of outsiders (presumably to raise external capital at lower cost) pay large dividends. In doing so 
these firms commit to fair treatment of their minority shareholders, not just in the current period, but 
also subsequent periods since dividend cuts are costly. The very fact that these firms wish to access 
external capital at cheaper cost by paying reputationally-enhancing dividends implicitly implies that these 
firms are in the early stages of their life-cycle, since ‘mature’ firms, by definition, have internal funds 
which more than meets their investment needs i.e. free cash flow. Financially-constrained firms are those 
that, by definition, have identified positive net present value projects, do not have sufficient internal 
capital to funds these projects, and face too high a cost to fund externally. By definition, these firms are 
very much likely to be ‘immature’. In contrast, the substitution model suggests that better-governed firms, 
without the necessity to enhance their reputation, pay lower dividends than their less well-governed 
                                                                                                                                                        
better-governed firms with free cash flow and external financing constraints pay lower dividends (compared to the 
same firms without external financing constraints).     
5 Some papers focus solely on the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and the dividend 
amount (see Mitton, 2004; Sawicki, 2009; and Chae, Kim & Lee, 2009). Others establish the relationship between 
the strength of corporate governance and the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount (see Byrne & 
O’Connor, 2012; Bartram, Brown, How & Verhoeven, 2012). Brockman and Unlu (2009, 2011), Byrne and 
O’Connor (2012), and Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2009) all focus on the relationship between country measures of 
shareholder (and creditor) rights and the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount.   
6 Using a sample of U.S. firms, Chae, Kim and Lee (2009) show that dividend payout increases in both corporate 
governance and the amount of free cash flow. However, in the absence of free cash flow, dividend payout actually 
decreases in the strength of corporate governance i.e. the substitution model prevails.  
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counterparts. Since the cost of (equity) capital decreases in corporate governance (Chen, Chen & Wei, 
2009), the substitute model predicts that firms substitute (higher) dividends for poor governance in the 
hope that reputationally-enhancing higher dividends reduces their cost of capital. Consequently, the 
substitution model predicts that, all else equal, dividend payouts decrease in shareholder rights. In contrast to 
the predictions of the outcome model, (poorly governed) firms voluntarily, rather than under duress from 
shareholders (of firms with efficient governance), pay large dividends. As is the case for the outcome 
model, there exists plenty of empirical support for the substitution model (e.g. John and Knyazeva (2006), 
Officer (2007), Jo and Pan (2009), Jiraporn and Ning (2006), Chae, Kim and Lee (2009), Sawicki (2009) in 
pre-Asian crisis Asia) and Mitton (2004) in civil law countries only).7 Brockman and Unlu (2011) show 
that the substitution model prevails in countries where disclosure environments are opaque and the 
outcome model in countries where disclosure environments are transparent. Shao, Kwok and Guedhami 
(2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) find support in favour of the substitution model where creditor 
rights are weak.                       
Furthermore, and purely from a theoretical viewpoint, there is no reason to suggest that the 
relationship between the strength of country and/or corporate governance and dividend payout is static 
i.e. does not change over time. In a dynamic setting, both Liu (2002) and O’Connor (2006) find support 
in favour of the outcome and substitution models of dividends. They show that dividend payouts are 
greatest when country (Liu, 2002), or corporate (O’Connor, 2006) governance is strong (i.e. the outcome 
model prevails), but changes in governance lead to lower dividends (i.e. the substitution model prevails). 
Liu (2002) finds that dividend payouts tend to be greatest in countries who score highly in variables which 
account for country-level governance (the outcome model), but country-level governance reforms (changes) 
are associated with lower dividends (the substitution model). O’Connor (2006) finds likewise, but instead he 
uses corporate in place of country governance. He shows that exchange trading cross-listing Level 2/3 
ADR firms substitute dividends for enhanced bonding, even though dividends remain higher in firms from 
countries with strong governance (the outcome model). Sawicki (2009) examines the agency models of 
                                                 
7 The results of these tests using U.S. firms are mixed. Using the anti-takeover governance index of Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003) to measure the strength of corporate governance of U.S. firms, Knyazeva (2006), Officer (2007), 
Jo and Pan (2009), and Jiraporn and Ning (2006) find in favour of the substitution model. Again using U.S. firms, 
but now using governance data from the Institutional Shareholder Services, Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011) find 
evidence in favour of the outcome model. The ISS data is a much broader corporate governance measure than the 
G-Index, which in turn, likely explains the conflicting findings.  
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dividends around the time of the Asian crisis. The substitute model prevails pre-crisis, while the outcome 
model prevails post-crisis.  
Along similar lines, it is likely that the outcome and substitution models will prevail, but most 
likely, at different stages along the corporate life-cycle. To elaborate, first consider when the outcome 
model is most likely to prevail. The outcome model of dividends is much more likely to manifest when 
firms are mature for a number of reasons. First, the outcome model rests crucially on the prevalence of 
free cash flow, which is likely to be of much greater relevance for mature firms since internally generated 
cash is more than sufficient to fund their diminishing investment opportunities (see Grullon, Michaely & 
Swaminathan, 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz, 2006; and Denis & Osobov, 2008). In support, Chae, 
Kim and Lee (2009) show that for U.S. firms, the dividend amount increases in free cash flow and the 
strength of corporate governance. Second, the outcome model is much less likely to manifest for well-
governed ‘immature’ firms, since the shareholders of these firms generally accept lower dividends given 
firm growth (see Mitton, 2004; and Bartram, Brown, How & Verhoeven, 2012). In contrast, the 
shareholders of poorly-governed firms do not. Furthermore, if external financing costs are prohibitively 
high for better-governed firms, their shareholders will again accept lower dividends (see Chae, Kim & 
Lee, 2009). While these arguments don’t automatically rule against the outcome model, they do suggest 
that it is less likely that the outcome model will prevail at early stages of the corporate life-cycle since the 
dividend polices of high-growth firms, with different governance practices, are likely to be more similar, 
than would be the case in the absence of growth (i.e. when firms are more ‘mature’). Third, the separation 
of ownership from control resulting in agency conflicts (and costs) between managers and minority 
shareholders is likely to be much more prevalent in complex, large ‘mature’ organizations. In contrast, in 
smaller, younger ‘immature’ firms, managers are much more likely to have a large controlling stake in the 
firm, thus reducing agency conflicts, since their interests are likely to be much better aligned with 
outsiders. As a result, the need for dividends to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow is more relevant 
for ‘mature’ firms and less relevant for ‘immature’ firms since the controlling managers have large cash 
flow rights in these firms, and as a consequence, the consumption of private benefits is likely to be much 
lower in these firms. Hence the agency costs of free cash flow are likely to be more severe for mature 
firms. This line of reasoning leads to the first testable hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1. The outcome model of dividends is more likely to prevail when firms are ‘mature’.  
The substitute model is likely to be much more relevant for ‘immature’ firms for some additional 
reasons not mentioned earlier. First, firms are much more likely to require external financing when they 
are young, ‘immature’, and growing fast. Since the costs of external financing are likely to be much higher 
for opaque poorly-governed firms (see Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009); there is a much greater incentive on the 
part of these firms to build reputation by paying large dividends. Hence, immature, young, opaque, and 
poorly-governed firms, with a need for external financing, may seek to establish a reputation for fair 
treatment of their minority shareholders by paying a dividend even given negative free cash flow. This, in 
turn may serve to reduce their cost of capital. Since bonding mechanisms are few in emerging markets, 
the emergence of the substitution model when firms are immature is a viable possibility (Benos & 
Weisbach, 2006). In contrast, there is much less of an incentive on the part of better-governed firms to 
follow suit since their cost of capital is likely to be much lower. This leads us to the second testable 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2. The substitution model of dividends is likely to prevail when firms are young and ‘immature’.   
Finally, recent work suggests that creditors and not shareholders exert the greatest influence over 
corporate dividend policy (see Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Shao, Kwok & Guedhami, 2009; and Byrne & 
O’Connor, 2012). Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) test the original 
agency costs of equity outcome and substitution models of dividends inclusive of the agency costs of 
debt. Both show that given the inclusion of the agency costs of debt that the outcome model of dividends 
prevails only where shareholders and creditors have considerable legal rights. When the latter are not well 
protected in law, and even when the former are, dividend payouts are much lower. Creditors demand, and 
firms consent to lower dividends. Hence, this leads to the third and final testable hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 3. The ability of firms to pay higher dividends rests crucially on strong creditor and shareholder rights.    
All three hypotheses are summarized in the bottom rows of Figure 1.     
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
DATA 
 [10] 
 
In this paper I examine the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and 
corporate dividend policy in emerging markets along the corporate life-cycle. To measure the strength of 
corporate governance, I follow Mitton (2004), and use the corporate governance scores developed by 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001).8 The CLSA governance ratings range from 0 to 100 with 
higher values suggesting better corporate governance. The rating for each individual firm, for which there 
is 495 in total across 25 countries, is a composite of 57 qualitative, binary (Yes/No) questions which span 
seven distinct governance categories, namely management discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social awareness. The first six governance provisions have a 
15% weighting in the composite index, while social awareness has a 10% weighting. The rating for each 
firm is constructed by CLSA analysts. In this paper, I use the first six governance provisions to construct 
the composite governance measure since dividend payout is unlikely to be related to social awareness. 
Consequently, the composite corporate governance score that I use in this paper is an equally weighed 
average of the first six corporate governance provisions.         
I use three different dividend payout measures, namely dividends-to-earnings (%), measured as 
dividends per share divided by earnings per share, dividends-to-cashflow (%), measured as dividends per 
share divided by cashflow per share, and dividends-to-sales (%), measured as cash dividends (paid to 
common and preferred shareholders) divided by net sales. All data is sourced from Worldscope at year 
end 2001. In all regressions, I control for firm size, firm profitability, firm growth, cash, total equity and 
retained earnings. Size is measured as the log of book assets in US$, growth is the logarithmic one-year 
asset growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to book assets, cash is cash 
scaled by book assets, and total equity is total shareholders’ equity once again scaled by book assets. Size 
and profitability are expected to impact positively on dividend policy. In contrast, high growth firms 
typically pay smaller dividends. Finally, the expected relationship between cash holdings and dividend 
payout is ambiguous. For example, firms with high cash reserves but with little or no demand for external 
finance are likely to pay a dividend. In contrast, those firms with anticipated future growth opportunities 
                                                 
8 These governance ratings have been used by many in a variety of settings. For example, and in addition to Mitton 
(2004) who explores the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy, Klapper and Love (2004) 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, Durnev and Kim (2005) governance 
and firm value, and more recently Chen, Chen and Wei (2009) governance and firm value via the cost of equity 
capital. 
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may finance this growth with their cash reserves, and refrain from paying a dividend. I proxy for the firms 
maturity or position along its life-cycle by using either retained earnings to total book assets (RE/TA) or 
retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE) (see DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz, 2006; Denis & Osobov, 
2008; and Brockman & Unlu, 2011). DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008) 
and Brockman and Unlu (2011) all show that dividend payout increases in RE/TA (and RE/TE), since as 
firms mature, the contribution of retained equity (relative to contributed equity) to total equity increases 
since firms become more profitable and have a reduced investment opportunity set, thus reducing the 
need for external (contributed) capital. Mature (Immature) firms are characterized with high (low) ratios 
of retained equity to total assets and retained equity to total equity. All firm level variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
I include two country level determinants of dividend policy, namely shareholder and creditor 
rights. The literature suggests that dividends can be an outcome of, or substitute for shareholder rights. More 
recent work incorporates the agency costs of debt (i.e. the conflict between shareholders and creditors) 
and estimates the joint effect of shareholder and creditor rights on corporate dividend policy (see 
Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Shao, Kwok & Guedhami, 2009; and Byrne & O’Connor, 2012). I use the 
revised version of the anti-director rights measure from Spamann (2010) to account for the strength of 
shareholder rights at the country-level. Since this data is missing for China, Hungary, and Poland, I use 
the Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) measure of shareholder rights for these 
countries. The creditor rights measure is from Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007) and ranges from a 
low of zero to a high of four, where higher values represent greater levels of creditor protection. 
Shareholders are best protected in Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa and Taiwan (all have a shareholder rights 
measure of 5), but much less so in China (Shareholder rights score of 1). Creditor protection is strongest 
in Hong Kong (Score of 4), and the weakest in Colombia and Mexico (Both have creditor rights scores of 
0) (see columns 15 and 16 of Table 1). A priori, the sign on the shareholder and creditor rights variables 
are expected to be positive.  
The final sample of firms is presented in Table 1. From my original sample, I lose 275 firms since 
some or all of the firm-level control variables are missing for these firms, resulting in a final sample of 
220 firms. These 220 firms come from 21 countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
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Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The number of firms varies considerably 
by country. Taiwan (31 firms) followed by Hong Kong (25) and Malaysia (22) supply the largest number 
of firms. In contrast, there is just a single firm from Argentina, Colombia, Hungary, and Peru in the final 
sample of firms. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 contain the median and standard deviation 
corporate governance score by country. They suggest that the median firm is best-governed in Peru 
(76.5), then Singapore (67.4), followed closely by the sole Argentinian firm (66.7). In contrast, the median 
firm is poorly governed in Pakistan (33.6) and Poland (37.7).9 Interestingly, while the median firm from 
Pakistan has the lowest governance score in this sample of firms, the greatest variation in governance 
scores occurs in Pakistan (standard deviation of 20.2). Hence, there are firms in Pakistan which are much 
better governed than their median counterpart. There is much less variation in corporate governance 
practices in Mexico (standard deviation of 4.0), Chile (4.2), and Korea (5.8). Overall, the median firm has 
a corporate governance score of 55.8, with a standard deviation of 14.6.10  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In the fifth to tenth columns of Table 1, I outline the median and standard deviation dividend 
payout by country, using all three dividend payout measures defined previously. They suggest that as a 
percentage of earnings, the median firm in Hungary (85.5%) followed closely by the median firms in 
Pakistan (76.8%) pay the largest dividends. In contrast, dividend payouts tend to be much lower in the 
Philippines (5.3%) and Korea (5.9%). The sole firms from Argentina and Poland pay no dividend at all in 
                                                 
9 A large literature exists which examines the firm and country-level factors which promote firms to practice better 
corporate governance (see for example, Klapper & Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005, 2007). These ‘governance-
predictions’ studies find that amongst others, large firms, firms with a need for external finance, and firms with large 
proportion of ‘soft/intangible’ assets practice good corporate governance. They also find that corporate governance 
improves with ownership concentration, provided there is no deviation from one-share-one-vote (i.e., dual-class 
firms typically have poorer governance than single-class share firms). Cross-listing firms and firms domiciled where 
country governance (e.g., shareholder rights strong, efficient judiciary) is strong also tend to be better governed. 
However, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) show that some firms with these ‘desirable’ characteristics may not 
necessarily practice better governance, since the costs of doing so can outweigh the perceived benefits. The costs of 
doing so are greater where financial development weak. Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) highlight the 
differences in governance practices between U.S. and non-U.S. firms, and show that amongst others, differences in 
financial development between the U.S. and non-U.S. countries can explain part of the superior governance 
practices of U.S. firms. Furthermore, recent work suggests that some firms do not adopt ‘desirable’ aspects of 
corporate governance since their adoption can prove to be value-decreasing (Black, de Carvalho & Gorga, 2011).     
10 Klapper and Love (2004) show that the variation in corporate governance ratings (using CLSA corporate 
governance scores) decreases as country level investor protection increases.   
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2001. When using either cashflow or sales, dividend payouts tend to be high in Colombia (median 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) are 82.2% and 6.0%, respectively), and Pakistan 
(median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) are 71.1% and 9.7%, respectively). The 
median firm pays much lower dividends in Brazil (median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to 
sales (%) are 9.5% and 2.9%, respectively), Korea (median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to 
sales (%) are 3.0% and 0.2%, respectively), and Taiwan (median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends 
to sales (%) are 9.3% and 1.1%, respectively). In the full sample, the median firm pays 23.4%, 15.4%, and 
2.2%, of its earnings, cashflow, or sales, respectively, as a dividend.   
Finally, I present the median and variation in retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA) and 
retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), respectively, in columns eleven to fourteen. Retained earnings, 
relative to either total assets or total equity, is much higher in Mexico (the median retained earnings to 
total assets (total equity) is 0.42 (0.98)), Peru (0.41 and 0.52, respectively), and Hong Kong (0.19 and 0.45, 
respectively). In contrast, retained earnings are much lower in Colombia (the median retained earnings to 
total assets (total equity) are 0.03 (0.05)), Hungary (0.01 and 0.01, respectively), and Korea (0.01 and 0.01, 
respectively). These figures suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in terms of firm maturity 
across the sample of firms. The median firms retained earnings, scaled by either total assets or total 
equity, is 0.12 and 0.27, respectively.            
 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I begin by first examining the relationship between the strength of corporate 
governance and dividend payout. Then, I proceed to examine this aforementioned relationship by stage 
of the corporate life-cycle. I end by examining these same relationships by the strength of creditor rights.  
I begin by estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form: 
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
idy c i
DIV GOV Size Growth Pr ofitability Cash TE RE
Industry Country
 
(1) 
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
8 c 9 c idy i
DIV GOV Size Growth Pr ofitability Cash TE RE
SR CR Industry
 
(2) 
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Where DIVi is either dividends-to-earnings (%), dividends-to-cashflow (%), or dividends-to-sales 
(%), and GOVi is the CLSA corporate governance score for each firm. Size, growth, profitability, cash, 
TE, and RE, are firm size, firm growth, firm profitability, firm cash, firm total equity, and firm retained 
earnings (to total assets), respectively. Industryidy are industry dummies, CountryC country dummies, SRC 
and CRC, shareholder and creditor rights, respectively.11 Financial firms are excluded. In Equation (2), 
country dummies are excluded when shareholder and creditor rights are included. All regressions are 
estimated with White (1980) standard errors. The coefficient estimates from estimating equations 1 and 2 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
RESULTS 
The findings presented in Table 2 are in line with Mitton (2004), and others, and provide support 
in favour of the outcome model of dividends. The coefficient estimates on the corporate governance 
variable are always positive and statistically different to zero. They range from a low of 0.07 (t 2.12; 
p<0.05) (using dividends to sales (%)) to a high of 0.438 (t 3.44; p<0.01) using dividends to earnings 
(%).12  These coefficient estimates imply that a one standard deviation change in corporate governance 
(14.6), which is close to the difference in the median corporate governance score for firms from India 
(53.4) and Singapore (67.4), changes dividend payout by 6.39 percentage points using dividends to 
earnings (%) (0.438 * 14.6), 4.96 percentage points using dividends to cashflow (%) (0.340 * 14.6), and 
1.037 percentage points using dividends to sales (%) (0.071 * 14.6). While not always statistically 
significant, the firm-level control variables are of the correct sign. Large and profitable firms pay higher 
dividends. Growth firms tend to pay lower dividends. Furthermore, and consistent with the life-cycle 
                                                 
11 Firms are designated into one of thirteen industries based on the following classifications using 4-digit SIC codes: 
Agriculture and Food (0100-0999 & 2000-2111); Mining and Construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399); 
Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200-2799); Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899); Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836); 
Extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399); Durable Manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579); Transportation 
(4000-4899); Utilities (4900-4999); Retail (5000-5999); Services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379); Computers (7370-
7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679); Public Administration (9000+). 
12 Mitton (2004) estimates variants of equations 1 and 2. His version of equation 1 excludes cash, total equity and 
retained earnings, and excludes these same variables and creditor rights from equation 2. Using both dividends to 
cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%), the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable is 
comparable across studies. For example, using equation 1, the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance 
variable reported by Mitton (2004) is 0.278 and 0.056 (Using dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%)), 
respectively. I report coefficient estimates of 0.270 and 0.070, respectively. Using dividends to earnings (%), the 
coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable are much larger in this study (0.369) compared to 0.271 
in Mitton (2004).       
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model of dividends, dividend payout (at least using dividends to earnings (%)) increases with corporate 
maturity i.e. when the ratio of retained earnings to total assets increases.13 Finally, I find no evidence to 
suggest that corporate dividend payouts increase in country-level shareholder and creditor rights.14 This 
contradicts the evidence presented in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) and Mitton 
(2004) in the case of shareholder rights, and Brockman and Unlu (2009), Shao, Kwok and Guedhami 
(2009), and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) in the case of creditor rights. The latter three all highlight the 
profound influence that creditors have, over and above shareholders, in determining corporate dividend 
payout.    
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In summary, the findings thus far are consistent with Mitton (2004), and many others, and 
provide support for the outcome model of dividends. Shareholders use their legal rights, in this instance 
measured at the firm-level, to extract large dividends from firms. All else equal, dividend payouts are 
greater in better governed firms. Next, I examine whether this relationship changes along the corporate 
life-cycle.  
 
Results by Stage of Corporate Life-Cycle 
To do so, I sub-divide my original sample of firms by level of retained earnings (either to total 
assets or total equity) and re-estimate equation 1 for each sub-sample of firms. Using the original sample 
of 220 firms, I create four quartiles, each with 55 firms, by level of retained earnings (to either total assets 
or total equity). The top panel of Table 3 outlines the mean and median RE/TA and RE/TE by quartile. 
The median RE/TA (RE/TE) ratio increases from 0.00 (0.00) for ‘immature’ firms (Lowest quartile) to a 
high of 0.43 (0.74) for ‘mature’ firms (Highest quartile). In the remaining rows of Table 3, and using each 
dividend payout measure, I present the average and standard deviation dividend payout and corporate 
governance score by retained earnings quartile. The summary findings using RE/TA are presented in the 
top panel, and RE/TE the bottom panel. “Lowest” and “Highest” correspond to the lowest and highest 
                                                 
13 The conclusions are qualitatively unaffected when I use RE/TE in place of RE/TA.   
14 Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012) do find support for the outcome model when they use Spamann’s 
(2010) anti-director rights measure.   
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RE/TA (RE/TE) quartiles, while (2) and (3) are the intermediate quartiles. Since the summary findings 
are similar using RE/TA and RE/TE, I will concentrate on discussing the findings using RE/TA. They 
suggest the following. First, and consistent with the life-cycle model of dividends, average (and 
unreported median) dividend payout increases in corporate maturity i.e. as RE/TA or RE/TE increases. 
For example, the average firm in the lowest RE/TA quartile pays 17.67% (10.21%) of its earnings 
(cashflow) in the form of a dividend. Dividend payout continues to increase as firms mature (27.34% and 
22.70%, respectively in quartile 2, and 34.82% and 24.97%, respectively in quartile 3). As expected, 
dividend payouts are the largest in the “Highest” RE/TA (or RE/TE) quartile. For example, using 
dividends to earnings (%) to measure dividend payout, the average firm in the “Highest” RE/TA quartile 
pays out 45.84% of its earnings in the form of a dividend, resulting in a 28.17 percentage point difference 
in average dividend payout between these firms and their “Lowest” RE/TA quartile counterparts. 
Interestingly, the average firm appears to practice better-governance as it matures. The governance score 
for the average firm increases from 50.97 in the lowest quartile to a high of 60.70 for the maturest of 
firms.15 Second, there is considerable variation in corporate governance practices and dividend payouts 
within each RE/TA quartile. Using RE/TA and dividends to earnings (%), the standard deviations range 
from 24.95% to 29.82%, while the corporate governance scores range from a low of 12.15 (in quartile 3) 
to a high of 16.61 in quartile 1. The variation in governance scores and dividend payouts within each 
quartile opens up the possibility that, all else equal, part of the variation in dividend payouts is explained 
by variations in corporate governance practices. What is not evident here is whether it is better or poorly-
governed firms which pay higher dividends. In the next section, I examine these possibilities in greater 
detail.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
To do so, I repeat the analysis presented in Table 3, but now by strength of corporate 
governance. For each quartile of firms, and using all three dividend payout measures, I outline the average 
dividend payout for firms with high (above-median) and low (below-median) corporate governance. Here 
again, the summary findings using RE/TA are presented in the top panel, and RE/TE the bottom panel, 
                                                 
15 In contrast, Loderer and Waelchli (2011) show that corporate governance quality deteriorates with firm age.   
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and since the summary findings are similar using RE/TA and RE/TE, I will once again concentrate on 
discussing the summary findings using RE/TA. They suggest the following. First, dividend payout 
increases in firm-level maturity, for both well and poorly governed firms. Using dividends to earnings 
(%), and from lowest to highest RE/TA quartile, dividend payout increases from 23.42% to 50.07% for 
better-governed firms (High Corporate Governance) and from 13.95% to 38.44% for poorly-governed 
firms (Low Corporate Governance). Second, and central to the goal of this paper, is that the outcome 
model of dividends holds, but only when firms are mature. Across all four quartiles, and again assuming 
all else equal, better governed firms pay larger dividends than poorly-governed firms. However, it is only 
when firms are mature i.e. in quartiles 3 and 4 that there is a statistically significant difference in dividend 
payouts between well and poorly-governed firms. Furthermore, this holds using all three dividend payout 
measures. For example, when dividends to earnings (%) is used to measure corporate dividend payout, 
better governed firms pay 11.63% more of their earnings as dividends than do poorly-governed firms do 
(compare 50.07% to 38.44%). Using dividends to sales (%), better governed firms pay significantly higher 
dividends compared to their less well governed firms in quartiles 3 and 4 (compare 5.76% and 3.57% in 
quartile 3 and 9.77% and 5.87% in quartile 4). These summary findings are largely supportive of 
hypothesis 1, but not hypothesis 2. In the next section, I examine whether these relations are maintained 
when I estimate equation 1 by level of RE/TA (and RE/TE).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
The coefficient estimates arising from estimating equation 1 by stage of corporate life-cycle are 
presented in Table 5. Since the findings from Table 4 suggest that there is a clear distinction in the 
relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout between quartiles 1 and 2 together and 3 
and 4 together, I estimate equation 1 for above (i.e. quartiles 3 and 4) and below-median (i.e. quartiles 1 
and 2) RE/TA and RE/TE. This has the additional benefit in that my regressions now include 110 firms, 
as opposed to just 55 firms if I was to estimate equation 1 by RE/TA (RE/TE) quartile. In Table 5, all 
firm, industry, and country controls are included, but not reported. The analysis presented in Table 5 is in 
line with that presented in Table 4, since the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable is 
only positive and statistically significant in the regressions estimated for mature firms only i.e. with above-
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median RE/TA or RE/TE. These findings suggest that the outcome model holds, but not along the 
corporate life-cycle. Shareholders use their legal rights to extract larger dividends from firms, not when 
firms are growing, but when firms are mature. It appears that the significant variation in dividend payouts 
for high-growth, immature firms, which was evident in Table 3, are in no part explained by variations in 
corporate governance practices (which were also evident in Table 3). These results support hypothesis 1, 
but not hypothesis 2.    
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
My findings thus far suggest the following. The outcome model holds only at latter stages of the 
corporate life-cycle. Dividend payouts are higher when corporations are mature (i.e. a high RE/TA or 
RE/TE) and are well-governed. When the RE/TA (RE/TE) ratio is low, better-governed firms still pay 
higher dividends, when compared to poorly-governed firms, but differences in corporate governance 
practices between well and poorly-governed firms appear to explain none of the differences in dividend 
payouts between these firms. Presumably a combination of firm and country-level factors explains the 
payout differences.  
 
Results by Stage of Corporate Life-Cycle & Strength of Creditor Rights 
In the final section of this paper, I examine if shareholders in mature well-governed firms are still 
able to extract large dividends from firms when creditor rights are weak. I do so, since recent work 
suggests that creditor exert a greater influence over corporate dividend payout than shareholders do (see 
Brockman and Unlu (2009), Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2009), and Byrne and O’Connor (2012)). In 
essence, their work shows that the outcome model of dividends, inclusive of the agency costs of equity 
and debt, is contingent on strong shareholder rights and creditor rights.16 Where creditor rights are weak, 
creditors demand, and firms consent to much lower dividends. If the same holds true here in this analysis, 
and there is no reason to expect otherwise, then a priori, I would expect that the coefficient estimate on 
the corporate governance variable to be large when creditor rights are strong and firms mature, and much 
smaller for mature firms in countries where creditor rights are weak. Hence, the shareholders of better-
                                                 
16 Brockman and Unlu (2009) and Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2009) use country-level shareholder rights measures. 
Byrne and O’Connor (2012) use country and firm-level measures of shareholder rights.   
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governed firms may not be able to extract large dividends if creditor rights are weak. This is unlikely to be 
a real concern for shareholders of firms in Malaysia, South Africa, and Singapore since the median firm 
tends to be well-governed in these countries and creditor rights strong. In contrast, the median firm is 
well-governed in Brazil, but creditor rights weak (see Table 1).     
As a precursor consider Table 6. In Table 6, I focus on the high corporate governance mature 
(High RE/TA or RE/TE) and ‘immature’ firms (Low RE/TA or RE/TE) and further sub-divide by 
strength of creditor rights. I present the average dividend payout, using all three dividend payout ratios, 
for each group of firms. A priori, if creditors exert influence on corporate dividend policy, then I would 
expect that dividend payouts should be larger when governance and creditor rights are strong. The 
summary dividend payouts for mature firms are presented in the top panel of Table 6. The bottom panel 
outlines the average payout statistics for the low RE/TA and RE/TE firms.   
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Let’s begin with the ‘mature’ firms (i.e. high RE/TA (RE/TE) firms). Using both RE/TA and 
RE/TE, and in line with prior expectations, dividends payouts are larger for better-governed firms in 
countries where creditor rights are strong. For these firms, dividend payouts tend to be much larger, 
albeit not always significantly so, when creditor rights are strong. In contrast, for the ‘immature’ firms, 
dividend payouts tend to be larger, albeit insignificantly so, where creditor rights are weak. Of course, the 
difference in average payouts may be determined by firm level characteristics, which once controlled for, 
will permit a more robust analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy 
in different legal regimes. This is where I turn to next.     
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
In Table 7, I estimate equation 1 now by strength of creditor rights. The top panel contains the 
coefficient estimates for the high RE/TA (RE/TE) group of firms, and the bottom panel the low 
RE/TA (RE/TE) firms. They suggest the following. First, when I sub-divide the mature firm sample by 
strength of creditor rights, and estimate equation 1, the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance 
variable are positive and statistically significant only where creditor rights are strong. The coefficient 
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estimates on the corporate governance variable range from 0.176 (t 4.57; p<0.01) (using dividends to 
sales (%)) to 0.496 (t 2.57, p<0.05) (using dividends to earnings (%)), when I use RE/TA to account for 
the firms stage in its life-cycle. Hence, dividends are an outcome of strong corporate governance and 
creditor rights. Interestingly, and consistent with Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2009) and Byrne and 
O’Connor (2012), the outcome model gives way to the substitution model, where creditor rights are weak. 
I, like them, am unable to explain this apparent anomaly. Second, when I perform the same analysis for 
the low RE/TA (RE/TE) group of firms, I find support in favour of the outcome model where creditor 
rights are strong. The coefficient estimates are consistent with the average payout summary measures 
presented earlier in Table 4. Specifically, the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable 
are positive and statistically significant (at least using dividends to earnings (%) and dividends to cashflow 
(%)) only where creditor rights are strong. Where they are not, the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance measure are much lower, sometimes negative, and always statistically insignificant.17 
Interestingly, in some instances dividends are more sensitive to governance for ‘immature’ firms where 
creditor rights are strong. For example, using dividends to earnings (%) as the payout measure and 
RE/TA as the life-cycle measure, the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable where 
creditor rights is strong is 0.629 (t 3.09; p<0.01) for ‘immature’ firms compared to 0.496 (t 2.57; 
p<0.05) for mature firms. These results suggest that, if anything, and contrary to our prior expectations 
which are summarised in hypothesis 2, the outcome model is more and not less relevant at early stages of 
the corporate life-cycle.      
In summary, my results are in line with Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2009) and Byrne and 
O’Connor (2012) who shows that the outcome model of dividends prevails where shareholders and 
creditors are well-protected. In this paper, I extend our understanding of the agency models by showing 
that the outcome model prevails in emerging markets where shareholder and creditor rights are strong. 
Furthermore, this relationship prevails all along the corporate life-cycle.   
 
 
                                                 
17 In appendix 1, I show that these conclusions remain unchanged when I define strong creditor rights where 
creditor rights are greater than (but not equal) to 2. This reclassification has the additional benefit that there is now a 
much larger number of firms, at least relative to before, in the low creditor rights group of firms.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 In this paper, I test the outcome and substitution models of dividends of La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) along the corporate life-cycle. I present three hypotheses. The first 
(and second) state that the outcome (substitution) model of dividends is most likely to prevail when firms 
are ‘mature’ (‘immature’). The third suggests that the ability on the part of firms to pay higher dividends, 
either as an outcome of strong governance, or a substitute for weak governance, is contingent on strong 
creditor rights. Using a sample of 220 firms from 21 emerging markets, I find no evidence to suggest that 
the substitution model prevails in emerging markets. In contrast, the outcome model holds at early and 
later stages along the corporate life-cycle. While, as expected, dividend payouts are much lower when 
firms are ‘immature’ i.e. have negative or low ratios of retained earnings to assets (or total equity), 
compared to when firms are ‘mature’, at all stages along the corporate life-cycle, better-governed firms 
pay larger dividends than their poorly-governed counterparts. However, on closer inspection, I find that 
they can only do so where creditor rights are strong. Where creditor rights are weak, shareholders of 
better-governed firms appear powerless to prevent firms from consenting to the demands from creditors 
for lower dividends. These findings are in line with those of Brockman and Unlu (2009), Shao, Kwok and 
Guedhami (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012). They show that the agency cost of equity and debt 
version of the outcome model of dividends holds i.e. dividend payouts are largest where shareholder and 
creditor rights are strong.          
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FIGURE 1 
Life-Cycle Model of Dividends & Summary of Hypotheses 
 Life-Cycle Model of Dividends 
 
 Years/ Corporate Maturity Increasing in Direction of Arrow 
→ 
Maturity Immature 
Low RE/TA (or RE/TE) 
Mature 
High RE/TA (or RE/TE) 
External Financing Need (EFN) High High  Moderate Low Low 
Internal Financing Negative or 
Low 
Negative or 
Low 
Low as a % of 
EFN 
High as a % of 
EFN 
Greater then 
EFN 
Capacity to Pay a Dividend None None Low Increasing High 
Growth Stage Start-up Rapid Expanse High Growth Mature Growth Decline 
  
 Summary of Hypotheses 
 
 Years/ Corporate Maturity Increasing in Direction of Arrow 
→ 
Maturity Immature 
Low RE/TA (or RE/TE) 
Mature 
High RE/TA (or RE/TE) 
Hypothesis 1 The outcome model of dividends is more likely to prevail when firms are ‘mature’ 
Hypothesis 2 The substitution model of dividends is likely to prevail when firms are young and ‘immature’ 
Hypothesis 3 The ability of firms to pay higher dividends rests crucially on strong creditor and 
shareholder rights   
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
This table describes the sample by country. # Firm is the number of firms. For each country, I report the median (MD) and 
standard deviation (SD) of corporate governance, dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), dividends to sales (%), 
retained earnings to total assets (RE/TE), and retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), respectively. In the remaining 
columns, I report shareholder rights (SR) data from Spamann (2009) and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and 
Poland), and creditor rights (CR) data from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All firm-level data is sourced from 
Worldscope.  Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).          
  Corporate 
Governance 
Dividend Payout Measures Corporate Life-Cycle 
Measure 
Shareholder 
& Creditor 
Rights 
  Corporate 
Governance 
Dividends 
to Earnings 
(%) 
Dividends 
to Cashflow 
(%) 
Dividends 
to Sales (%) 
Retained 
Earnings to 
Total Assets 
(RE/TA) 
Retained 
Earnings to 
Total Equity 
(RE/TE) 
Shareholder 
& Creditor 
Rights 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Country # 
Firm 
MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD SR CR 
Argentina 1 66.7 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.06 - 0.18 - 3 1 
Brazil 14 61.8 9.1 31.9 34.3 9.5 27.7 2.9 6.0 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.27 5 1 
Chile 7 62.4 4.2 34.8 16.5 11.7 10.5 1.3 1.7 0.11 0.13 0.40 0.21 5 2 
China 11 48.2 11.6 28.8 24.7 15.9 17.5 5.8 7.9 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.10 1 2 
Colombia 1 53.2 - 66.0 - 82.2 - 6.0 - 0.03 - 0.05 - 4 0 
Hong Kong 25 59.8 14.4 43.1 32.7 46.7 32.2 6.1 9.2 0.19 0.81 0.45 0.40 4 4 
Hungary 1 48.5 - 85.5 - 10.6 - 0.5 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 2 1 
India 13 53.4 10.4 19.7 23.6 13.7 28.1 3.4 2.4 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.18 4 2 
Indonesia 12 36.3 13.6 23.7 26.0 20.3 26.6 2.0 4.8 0.23 0.23 0.57 0.55 4 2 
Korea 13 39.7 5.8 5.9 9.2 3.0 4.9 0.2 0.8 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.40 4 3 
Malaysia 22 60.3 12.8 33.4 30.2 27.0 27.5 4.8 5.1 0.31 0.14 0.51 0.22 4 3 
Mexico 4 67.0 4.0 28.1 14.9 15.4 8.0 4.0 2.8 0.42 0.28 0.98 0.76 2 0 
Pakistan 4 33.6 20.2 76.8 40.7 71.1 36.4 9.7 7.8 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 5 1 
Peru 1 76.5 - 18.9 - 33.0 - 8.0 - 0.41 - 0.52 - 4 0 
Philippines 12 40.6 12.2 5.3 19.6 0.4 18.6 0.2 1.6 0.12 0.46 0.48 0.76 4 1 
Poland 1 37.7 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.14 - 0.40 - 2 1 
Singapore 18 67.4 6.7 44.0 31.9 24.8 29.0 1.9 7.1 0.14 0.30 0.45 0.62 4 3 
Sth Africa 16 64.3 16.1 27.5 33.0 22.6 23.3 2.9 7.2 0.15 0.27 0.67 0.40 5 3 
Taiwan 31 54.9 9.1 17.4 25.4 9.3 20.2 1.1 3.5 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.42 5 2 
Thailand 6 54.6 15.3 46.0 38.8 26.0 20.6 4.6 8.5 0.18 0.17 0.37 0.41 4 2 
Turkey 7 46.6 10.6 0.0 20.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.6 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.27 4 2 
 Total Sample 
 
  MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD Median 
 220 55.8 14.6 23.4 29.5 15.4 26.4 2.2 6.2 0.12 0.34 0.27 0.67 4 2 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Estimates 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), dividends to 
cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. Size is the log of book assets in US$, growth is logarithmic one-year asset 
growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation to book assets, cash is cash to assets, and total equity to total assets, 
retained earnings is retained earnings to total assets. In columns (1), (3), and (5) a full set of country and industry dummies are 
included, but not reported. The country dummies are excluded from columns (2), (4), and (6). Shareholder rights data is from 
Spamann (2009) and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland), and creditor rights data is from Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA 
(2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.369** 
(2.20) 
0.438*** 
(3.44) 
0.270* 
(1.91) 
0.340*** 
(3.05) 
0.070** 
(2.12) 
0.071*** 
(2.86) 
       
Size 
 
1.862 
(1.08) 
1.554 
(1.04) 
0.615 
(0.42) 
0.219 
(0.18) 
0.547* 
(1.66) 
0.442* 
(1.68) 
Growth 
 
-29.690** 
(2.06) 
-27.235** 
(2.18) 
2.691 
(0.22) 
2.893 
(0.27) 
-3.065 
(1.02) 
-2.359 
(0.91) 
Profitability 
 
18.308 
(0.80) 
8.653 
(0.48) 
26.156 
(1.49) 
20.806 
(1.42) 
12.467*** 
(3.04) 
10.816*** 
(2.88) 
Cash 
 
8.099 
(0.44) 
9.541 
(0.57) 
7.611 
(0.52) 
11.278 
(0.86) 
3.731 
(0.97) 
4.354 
(1.19) 
Total Equity (TE) 
 
15.975 
(1.11) 
20.804 
(1.56) 
8.712 
(0.67) 
13.970 
(1.21) 
8.893*** 
(3.10) 
8.897*** 
(3.48) 
Retained Earnings (RE)  
 
16.864** 
(2.46) 
13.471** 
(2.15) 
9.548 
(1.51) 
5.821 
(1.03) 
0.475 
(0.49) 
0.214 
(0.23) 
Shareholder Rights (SR) 
 
 -0.485 
(0.21) 
 0.382 
(0.24) 
 -0.425 
(0.97) 
Creditor Rights (CR) 
 
 1.588 
(0.69) 
 3.004 
(1.46) 
 0.475 
(1.08) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.388 0.306 0.457 0.390 0.508 0.448 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics by RE/TA, RE/TE and Corporate Governance 
This table reports the average and variation (standard deviation) of dividend payout ratios and corporate governance by level of 
retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), or retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), as indicated. Firms are assigned to one 
of four RE/TA or RE/TE quartiles. The top panel reports the mean and median retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), or 
retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), as indicated. The sample period is for the year 2001. Dividend payout is measured 
using dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. All firm-level data is 
sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).  
 Summary Statistics 
 
 
 RE/TA Quartile  
 Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
Mean (0.15) 0.07 0.20 0.45 0.60 
Median 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.43 0.43 
 RE/TE Quartile  
 Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
Mean (0.50) 0.18 0.43 1.34 1.84 
Median 0.00 0.17 0.42 0.74 0.74 
 Dividend Payout by RE/TA and RE/TE Quartile 
 
 RE/TA 
Average RE/TA Quartile  
 Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
Dividends to Earnings (%) 17.67 27.34 34.82 45.84 28.17 
Dividends to Cashflow (%) 10.21 22.70 24.97 37.78 27.57 
Dividends to Sales (%) 2.47 3.33 4.69 8.35 5.88 
Corporate Governance 50.97 53.31 55.87 60.70 9.73 
 RE/TA 
Standard Deviation RE/TA Quartile  
 Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
Dividends to Earnings (%) 29.82 28.29 27.98 24.95 (4.87) 
Dividends to Cashflow (%) 20.53 28.07 23.97 25.52 4.99 
Dividends to Sales (%) 5.37 5.46 4.95 7.29 1.92 
Corporate Governance 16.61 13.48 12.15 14.89 (1.72) 
 RE/TE 
Average RE/TE Quartile  
 Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
Dividends to Earnings (%) 18.33 33.99 36.60 36.57 18.24 
Dividends to Cashflow (%) 12.56 25.23 28.60 29.04 16.48 
Dividends to Sales (%) 2.62 4.67 5.31 6.24 3.62 
Corporate Governance 50.66 56.06 56.65 56.13 5.47 
 RE/TE 
Standard Deviation RE/TE Quartile  
 Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
Dividends to Earnings (%) 29.32 30.82 28.68 25.74 (3.58) 
Dividends to Cashflow (%) 23.71 27.50 25.41 26.01 2.30 
Dividends to Sales (%) 5.38 6.12 5.90 6.98 1.60 
Corporate Governance 16.33 12.97 12.65 15.53 (0.80) 
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TABLE 4 
Summary Statistics by RE/TA, RE/TE and Corporate Governance 
This table reports the average dividend payout by level of retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA) and corporate governance, 
or retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE) and corporate governance, as indicated. Firms are assigned to one of four RE/TA 
or RE/TE quartiles, and a high (above-median) or low (below-median) corporate governance group. The sample period is for 
the year 2001. Dividend payout is measured using dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales 
(%), as indicated. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). ***, 
**, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 RE/TA 
 
 RE/TA Quartile  
Dividends to Earnings (%) Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
High Corporate Governance 23.42 28.88 40.22 50.07 26.65 
Low Corporate Governance 13.95 26.00 29.22 38.44 24.49 
Difference 9.47 2.88 11.00 11.63*  
 RE/TA Quartile  
Dividends to Cashflow (%) Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
High Corporate Governance 14.50 26.44 30.33 39.24 24.74 
Low Corporate Governance 7.43 19.47 19.41 35.23 27.80 
Difference 7.07 6.97 10.92* 4.01  
 RE/TA Quartile  
Dividends to Sales (%) Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
High Corporate Governance 3.30 2.69 5.76 9.77 6.47 
Low Corporate Governance 1.93 3.88 3.57 5.87 3.94 
Difference 
 
1.37 (1.19) 2.19* 3.90*  
 RE/TE 
 
 RE/TE Quartile  
Dividends to Earnings (%) Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
High Corporate Governance 23.33 35.51 42.71 42.71 19.38 
Low Corporate Governance 15.48 32.52 28.46 28.29 12.81 
Difference 7.85 2.99 14.25* 14.42**  
 RE/TE Quartile  
Dividends to Cashflow (%) Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
High Corporate Governance 14.45 29.77 34.51 32.44 17.99 
Low Corporate Governance 11.48 20.85 20.73 24.46 12.98 
Difference 2.97 8.92 13.78** 7.98  
 RE/TE Quartile  
Dividends to Sales (%) Lowest (2) (3) Highest High – Low 
High Corporate Governance 3.34 4.68 6.21 8.11 4.77 
Low Corporate Governance 2.21 4.66 4.10 3.71 1.50 
Difference 1.13 0.02 2.11 4.40**  
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TABLE 5 
Regression Estimates by Level of RE/TA and RE/TE 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms with high (above-median) 
and low (below-median) retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), or retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), as indicated. 
The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. A full 
set of firm-level controls, country and industry dummies are included, but not reported. All firm-level data is sourced from 
Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * 
denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividend Payout Ratio 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 RE/TA 
 
 Low 
 RE/TA 
High  
RE/TA 
Low 
 RE/TA 
High  
RE/TA 
Low 
 RE/TA 
High  
RE/TA 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.241 
(0.84) 
0.392* 
(1.87) 
0.164 
(0.70) 
0.285 
(1.18) 
0.010 
(0.01) 
0.170*** 
(3.26) 
       
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 110 110 110 110 110 110 
R-Squared 0.605 0.516 0.592 0.516 0.538 0.557 
 Dividend Payout Ratio 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 RE/TE 
 
 Low  
RE/TE 
High  
RE/TE 
Low  
RE/TE 
High  
RE/TE 
Low  
RE/TE 
High  
RE/TE 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.212 
(0.69) 
0.200 
(0.89) 
0.250 
(1.06) 
0.076 
(0.37) 
0.022 
(0.38) 
0.129** 
(2.60) 
       
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 110 110 110 110 110 110 
R-Squared 0.563 0.555 0.604 0.506 0.554 0.585 
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TABLE 6 
Summary Statistics by Level of RE/TA, RE/TE and Creditor Rights 
This table reports average dividend payout ratios by level of governance and creditor rights for firms with above-median 
retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), or above-median retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), as indicated. The sample 
period is for the year 2001. Dividend payout is measured using dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and 
dividends to sales (%), as indicated. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from 
CLSA (2001). Creditor rights data is from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
 
Dividends to 
Earnings (%) 
Dividends to 
Cashflow (%) 
Dividends to Sales 
(%) 
 High RE/TA 
 
High Corporate Governance & High Creditor Rights 47.33 36.97 8.21 
High Corporate Governance & Low Creditor Rights 30.18 19.23 5.87 
Difference 17.15 17.74* 2.34 
 Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
 
Dividends to 
Earnings (%) 
Dividends to 
Cashflow (%) 
Dividends to Sales 
(%) 
 High RE/TE 
 
High Corporate Governance & High Creditor Rights 44.63 35.60 7.40 
High Corporate Governance & Low Creditor Rights 27.39 16.60 5.07 
Difference 17.24 19.00* 2.33 
 Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
 
Dividends to 
Earnings (%) 
Dividends to 
Cashflow (%) 
Dividends to Sales 
(%) 
 Low RE/TA 
 
High Corporate Governance & High Creditor Rights 24.76 19.63 2.33 
High Corporate Governance & Low Creditor Rights 30.91 24.43 4.85 
Difference (6.15) (4.80) (2.52) 
 Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
 
Dividends to 
Earnings (%) 
Dividends to 
Cashflow (%) 
Dividends to Sales 
(%) 
 Low RE/TE 
 
High Corporate Governance & High Creditor Rights 29.58 22.23 3.76 
High Corporate Governance & Low Creditor Rights 32.75 26.58 5.26 
Difference (3.17) (4.35) (1.50) 
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TABLE 7 
Regression Estimates by Level of RE/TA, RE/TE and Creditor Rights 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms with high (above-median) 
and low (below-median) retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA) (or retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), as indicated), 
domiciled in countries with high (above-median) and low (below-median) creditor rights. The dependent variable is dividends to 
earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. A full set of firm-level control are included, 
but not reported. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # 
Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 High RE/TA 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.729 
(1.56) 
0.496** 
(2.57) 
-0.446 
(0.71) 
0.404** 
(2.32) 
-0.010 
(0.09) 
0.176*** 
(4.57) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 13 97 13 97 13 97 
R-Squared 0.445 0.197 0.275 0.148 0.754 0.271 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 High RE/TE 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.528** 
(2.60) 
0.447** 
(2.34) 
-0.422 
(0.80) 
0.354** 
(2.14) 
-0.010 
(0.22) 
0.153*** 
(4.42) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 14 96 14 96 14 96 
R-Squared 0.889 0.257 0.386 0.168 0.784 0.302 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 Low RE/TA 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.103 
(0.20) 
0.629*** 
(3.09) 
0.027 
(0.06) 
0.414*** 
(2.83) 
-0.021 
(0.27) 
0.032 
(0.88) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 26 84 26 84 26 84 
R-Squared 0.335 0.257 0.328 0.276 0.489 0.295 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 Low RE/TE 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.362 
(0.54) 
0.711*** 
(3.45) 
0.069 
(0.13) 
0.491*** 
(3.08) 
-0.010 
(0.05) 
0.057 
(1.42) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 25 85 25 85 25 85 
R-Squared 0.325 0.300 0.306 0.289 0.475 0.365 
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APPENDIX 1 
Regression Estimates by Level of RE/TA, RE/TE and Creditor Rights 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms with high (above-median i.e. 
creditor rights measure greater than 2) and low (below-median i.e. creditor rights measure less than and equal to 2) retained 
earnings to total assets (RE/TA) (or retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE), as indicated), domiciled in countries with high 
(above-median) and low (below-median) creditor rights. The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), dividends to 
cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. A full set of firm-level control are included, but not reported. All firm-
level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, 
and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 High RE/TA 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.176 
(0.55) 
0.388 
(1.51) 
-0.072 
(0.23) 
0.464** 
(2.26) 
0.102** 
(2.19) 
0.206*** 
(3.69) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 52 58 52 58 52 58 
R-Squared 0.079 0.321 0.239 0.183 0.336 0.272 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 High RE/TE 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.019 
(0.10) 
0.438 
(1.41) 
-0.316 
(1.62) 
0.461** 
(2.07) 
0.062 
(1.48) 
0.182*** 
(3.29) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 49 61 49 61 49 61 
R-Squared 0.342 0.308 0.456 0.195 0.425 0.284 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 Low RE/TA 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.087 
(0.40) 
0.976*** 
(2.86) 
0.190 
(1.05) 
0.499* 
(1.97) 
0.010 
(0.11) 
0.036 
(0.58) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 74 36 74 36 74 36 
R-Squared 0.256 0.409 0.257 0.281 0.291 0.355 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 Low RE/TE 
 
 Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Low  
Creditor 
High  
Creditor 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.115 
(0.48) 
0.831** 
(2.18) 
0.265 
(1.33) 
0.323 
(1.25) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
0.044 
(0.70) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 77 33 77 33 77 33 
R-Squared 0.221 0.476 0.229 0.472 0.253 0.590 
 
 
